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creases and decreases of the domestic firm. Domestic input suppliers can there-
fore. lose from such policies, even when set at free trade levels. The relation
between input demands, the form of protection, and the degree of substitution
between inputs is shown to define the effects of content protection and topro-
vide the basis for understanding who might lobby for protection in different
environments.
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Content protection schemes are means often used by developing
attempting to build a manufacturing base, and by developed countri
prevent the erosion of such a base in industries threatened by for
competition. Taiwan has used such policies in the television and
refrigerator industries, while the U.S. has used them to revitaliz
building industry. Canada used them to protect her auto industry
Auto Pact.3 Among the more pernicious of such schemes seem to be
content protection schemes that have been in existence in Australi
auto industry for almost 25 years. These schemes have led to a
proliferation of models unwarranted by technological conditions
size and a cost almost double that of imports. For a very amus
informative history——see Gregory and Ho (1985). More recently,
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3.2 Content Protection and the Profit Function.
Let n(w,w*) and n*(w,w*) be the profit functions of the domestic and
9
Consider the effect of a content protection scheme which requires that
the ratio of physical inputs, usedin producing a unit of output
—6 be at least as great as u. Physical content protection schemes
might be possible to implement for goods like yarn where different fibers
are combined to produce yarn. We use Diagram 1 to illustrate our arguments.
In it, F(z,z*) =Itraces out the efficient combinations ofzand z*
needed to make a unit of final output. The combinations of inputs which
both make a unit of output and give > &isgiven by the shaded
area in Diagram I.If w exceeds (4 in Diagram 1, the content
protection scheme can be seen to be binding, and alw), a'(w) are the
unit input coefficients.If w is less than (4,itis not binding,'
and unit input choices are the unconstrained ones. The ratio (w) in
a*
the absence of any protection is depicted in Diagram 3 by a downward sloping
curve such as BB' for obvious r constraint makes this easons. The
We will define the profit function in the presence of a scheme as a
composite of the unconstrained profit function, n(w, w') and the profit
function on the assumption the constraint is binding, ii1w,w*).On the
assumption the constraint is binding, minimized unit costs of production are
given by clw,w*)wa(w) +w*a*(w).c(w,w*) exceeds cw,w*), except when
w =w,the point at which the constraint just bites, where it is equal to c(w,w*).
Let n(w,w*) and n*(w,w*) denote the profit functions for the home and
foreign firms respectively on the assumption that the scheme is binding so that:
(7)n(w,w*) =(w—r)a(w)D(aU4)w+a*(w)w*)and
(8)rv*lw,w*) =(w*—r*)a*(w)D(a(w)w+a*Cw)w*).
A Aforeign firm when the content protection scheme is imposed. The scheme is binding if
W C.J andis not binding if (j.)< L.a.This allows us
A A
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firm must be continuous,
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turn to this task in what
of n is that the best response function of the foreign
while that of the domestic firm need not be. These
ifl help us to characterize the form of the best
the presence of a content protection scheme. We
follows.
113.3 Content Protection and Best Responses
Under a content protection scheme 11iseither iiorn and the switch
between them is made along =(.3where they are equal to one another.
This switching between profit functions makes characterization of the best
response functions slightly tricky. First we will derive the best response
associated with n(w,w*}, which we denote by B(w*). Define B(w*) as the
best response function associated with n(w,wt). B(w*) is, as before, the
best response function associated with n(w,w*). B*(w), B*(w) and B*(w)
are defined analogously. B,B* and B,B* are depicted in Diagram 5)0
As n(w,w*) is made up of segments of 11andn, and 11switchesfrom n
to n at (.3 =w,B must be either B or B or lie along the kink at w W.
However, for B to lie along the kink, n must be upward sloping and 11must
be downward sloping at the kink. This possibility has been ruled out.
Therefore, B(w*) is either 8(w*) or B(w*). Moreover, Lemma I which follows
characterizes the conditions when it is one or the other.
Lemma 1Take a given value of w* and let ii, nbe evaluated at w =Un.
w w
If it(w,w*)> it(w,w*)> 0,
w w —
then B(w*) BCw*).
If it(w,w*}> 0 > it(w,w*},
14 14
then (w,w*) =B(w*) ifn(B(w*) ,w*) < n(B(w*) ,w*)
=B(w*) if nB(w*),w*) > n(B(w*),w*)
=EB(w*),B(w*}) if ;(B(w*),w*) n(B(w*),w*).





Lemma 1 is obvious once itisdrawn as in Diagram 4 .fl
Lemma1 completely characterizes the best response function,








______Followsfrom drawing in as in Diagram 4.








In an analogous fashion to our argument about B(w*), we can show that
is either B*(w) or B*(wl, or that it lies along the line (4 =(4.
n*(w,w*) is known to be concave in tfl for a given w, the best response
on B*(w) must be continuous. Moreover, B*(w*) can be completely
:ed as follows in Lemma 2.
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Using Lemmas 1' and 2', one can show that the equilibri
to that in Section 3.Theonly difference; are that B(w) K
jump in B occurs below Therefore, if the product; are mu
a value added scheme set at free trade levels lowers the equi
the domestic firm.If the products are complements, domestic
results of Section 3 are seen to be reversed when a value add
considered and C K 1.Notice also the tendency for prices to
equilibrium, as opposed to their tendency to rise when C > 1.
illustrates the equilibrium when C K 1.








3-When Y < 1, the M" effect on the domestic producer causes him to lower
his price. As the restriction gives the foreign producer an incentive to
lower his price in response to a lower domestic price, foreign price falls.
If the goods are complements this raises domestic profits. Since the M.
effects always raises profits, both M" and JOeffectswork in the same
direction, and domestic profits rise.If the goods are substitutes, the "I"
effect of lowering foreign prices arid hence domestic profits, worksagainst
the 'M effect and in fact outweighs it so domestic profits fall. The
effect on foreign profits is again less clear.
We suinnarize the main results in this section as Theorem 2.
Theorem 2
The effect of a value added content protection scheme, set at the free
trade level, depends on whether the elasticity of substitution, i,ismore
or less than one, as well as whether the products are substitutes or
complements.If O > I foreign prices rise,and if the products are
substitutes, domestic profits rise, while if they are complements, domestic
profits fall.If iT<1, foreign prices fall, and if the products are
substitutes, domestic profits fall, but they rise if the products are
complements. As before, average domestic prices, foreign profits, and
domestic input use could rise or fail.
22cost of production, which equals p, the price of the final good.
Of course,
T(q, c(w, w*) =cf(q/c)+qb(q/c).
Thus:
n(w, w*) =(w—r)a(w)f(q/c) D(T(q,c)) and
r*(w, w*) =(w*_r*)a*(W)f(q/c)D(T(q,c))
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the demand for intermediate
one inputs prices causes
demand for the other input
as the cost of production
ses the price of the final
h input demands. Thus1 the
f substitution in product
ermediate good demands are
Best response functions
where 0 and e are constants,
shows that they have t
ww* equilibrium. This therefore
functions, as long as second
as possible "a priori" —nam
not possible in the CESICED
case the elasticity of z wit
interior maximum to profits
3. See Johnson (1963).
could be upward or downward sloping. In
an examination of the second derivatives
he same sign as (7—E:)(7—1)about the Nash
gives the sign of the slope of the best response
order conditions hold. However, a case thought of
ely ii >0, and TI <0, (7< 1, and < a)is ww' case. This can be seen by noticing that in this
h respect to w is always less than 1.Hence, no
exists.
4. In his paper complementarity is defined by the marginal product
the use of the other input. This is always true if there are only
inputs and constant returns to scale.
5. The point that inter
has been made by Krishn
restrictions and tariff
is based on her work.
action effects can change equilibrium in
a (1934) in her analysis of voluntary export
—quota non equivalence under oligopoly. Our
surprisingways
analysis
6.We assume throughout that the penalty for
compliance is ensured. Therefore, the actual





the preceding would be true even if the constraint
at least a to produce a unit of output.
was set in
B. It is also easy to verify that n(w,w*) < n(w,w*) if w<4*, but that the
reverse is not necessarily so when w>(.*.
10. B and *aredownward
positively sloped if D is
sloping as long as Elis
convex enough as in the
3Q
not too convex. They are
constant elasticity case.
2. The demands for intermediate goods can
goods, although the inputs are themselves
be like those for complementary final










































9. The proof consists of showing that 11*is
functionsand therefore concave. These func
is n* for w* below W/w and the tangent plane
.J/w.
the minimum of two concave
tions are n* and a function
to r* at ..J/w for w* above

















16. This is not possible in the CES—CED example mentioned earlier, as 1>C>e was
not consistent with a bounded profit function.
17. This uses the facts that a =TrIr,*and 0 =n*0*.Also, for the
a —a CES case —= w
0 1—a
Letting C =(A) and solving
for 0, 0*, q, i)*interms of a and C ,usingthe previous equalities,
gives r =aI(l+C),n* =ciC/(1+C),0= C/(l+C) and 0* =lI(l+C).
Adapting these results when Y F(C(Z,Z*) L) gives the next equation
lci in the text as follows. Define 4'analogously to C as 4' (q/c)
where cc(w,w*), the unit cost of making the composite input, and q
is the price of labor. If is the elasticity of substitution between
the composite input and labor, then =I(l-4),
flfI(l4),
(1968), Singh and Vives (1984), and Eaton and Grossman
on a point going back to Edgeworth and Bertrand.
We use the former case to illustrate the model.
on this pictoral representation and we say more
11. It would be incorrect to
exceeds n(B(w*) ,w*) ,butto
both B and B if the two prof
possibility that n(B(w*),w*)
In this event, B(w*} =B(w')








be B(w*) if the reve
it levels_aLe equal.
exceeds rUB (w*),w*
















restriction has changed the nature of interactions between
whether best response functions are upward or downward
of the restriction, it becomes optimal for the foreign
response to price increases.
14. Formally, a*(c41u) will be defined by F;a*(W,
and a(w,cx) =d(w,cx)a*(w,cdwhere d(L) ==
theseare the cost minimizing input coefficients.
is not binding, so the cost minimizing inputs wil
However, we will define c(w,w',cd as being equal
15. Another way of seeing how z (w,w*,cd and z (w,fl) differ
that the only difference between them lie in he differing
in w for a fixed w If C>1, an in











and a(w, cx) to changes
ss than it lowers
constraintbinds
for input price i
_________nw. Similar'y,
nds for low w
oreign producer.






h w's the input


















for low w, lowering
trant binds
than z
is no incentive to change price on the
1, an increase in w makes a(W,cx)
elastic than z. However, as the
price is profitable for the gomestic
on the foreign firm for high w ,andas
there is no reasonfor the foreign firm to
so that = 1—a
1%. See Sonnenschein
for some recent work
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